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 A proposal for the New Shape Prize: CIVICS: Changing Incentives for Voters in 
International Cooperation through Sampling 
 
Nikola K. Blanchard  and Olivier Pivot 1
 
 
General Idea 
This model is built around the principle that any actor in a global governance institution should                
have interests aligned with mankind’s. This means creating an incentive structure to make sure              
that in each different component, every member’s best interest is to faithfully play their role,               
which is sadly not the case today. 
Despite widespread awareness of the dangers of inaction on issues such as climate change,              
policy on the matter evolves very slowly, although a strong majority in most countries would               
prefer their government do more to prevent or counter its effects (including India, China and the                
USA). This is only one specific case of humanity agreeing on the need for action (and even                 
often on what needs to be done), only for most policy-makers to shrink from pursuing truly                
effective policies due to personal or electoral risks and diverse lobbying interests. Current             
policy-makers do have an advantage, however, in that they are able to spend more time               
focused on the issue with teams of experts, and have access to more detailed and current                
information. 
The goal is then to have decision-makers with the same interests as the general population, but                
with a decent understanding of the consequences of any decision taken. Once we make sure               
that the decision-makers are incorruptible, well-intentioned and well-informed, it is enough to            
design a system by which their decisions are respected and implemented by the international              
community. This model presents one way of obtaining such a set of decision-makers, and the               
tools they need to enforce the decisions taken.  
Our model has a traditional parliamentary structure with some nuances. The upper house is              
mostly present to bring expertise and guidance from the international community, while the             
lower house composed of anonymous citizens is in charge of the final decision. An executive               
council then makes sure that the decisions are respected by all the member countries.  
 
We will first explain some recent theoretical and technological developments which are at the              
heart of the model. Once this is done, we will present its different components and show how                 
the model could be implemented before analyzing its potential weaknesses and their respective             
solutions.  
 
Mathematical and Technological Considerations 
The model relies heavily on sampling. In this context, sampling corresponds to the selection at               
random of a group of people from the general human population, with every person getting the                
same chance of being in the group. As this is how the groups who compose the lower house are                   
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chosen, we want to be sure of the representativity of the sampled group (that is, we want to be                   
certain that it accurately represents humanity as a whole).  
Luckily, there is a well-studied theorem that is directly applicable in this context. Suppose that               
we take a random sample with one million members. If we were to create 5000 different                
categories of people (with any type of criteria, from citizenship, age or gender to hair color or                 
musical preferences), the theorem states that all categories would be represented accurately in             
the sample with extremely high probability. To be precise, ​accurately ​here means with a margin               
smaller than 0.5% (more precise than most data we have, especially for criteria liable to change                
with time). ​Extremely high probability signifies that one could have taken one such sample every               
second since the Big Bang while keeping a negligible probability of finding any category              
represented with more than 0.5% error.  
This seems to run against our recent experience of opinion polls which have way bigger               
margins, even with large samples. The main difference here is that opinion polls have extremely               
low response rates (generally 5-10%), as the people do not feel really responsible and often feel                
they have better things to do, which creates a huge sampling bias. Unlike with polls, being                
selected to be a member of an international parliament would mean a strong responsibility, and               
all current voter models predict a very low abstention in such situations, hence a good               
representativity.  
 
We have just shown that taking one million people randomly from all of Earth would give a                 
strongly representative sample of humanity in general. It is now time to look at the technologies                
that could create such a sample, and then help it do its duty. As it happens, the past ten years                    
have been a boon for democratic innovations, with major progress in multiple directions. First,              
there are now many systems that allow secure online voting, with no risk of hacking (proved                
mathematically).  
 
Secure voting protocols. ​Voting securely and anonymously has been a point of concern for              
centuries, and until the early 2000s there were no systems that could allow for full transparency                
and auditability while preserving the anonymity of voters. Although they are not yet deployed in               
any major democracy, mathematically secure voting systems have been developed that work            
both online and with paper ballots.  
These guarantee that the result of the election cannot be tampered with, but we need more in                 
order for our model to work. As it happens, one recently developed tool called Random Sample                
Voting (or RSV), has all the required properties. It would allow the system to do the following: 
- Select a group of people at random from the global human population. 
- Give them all a way to vote securely online (or offline through a proxy). 
The system also prevents all forms of corruption and coercion as it guarantees the anonymity of                
all selected people, to the point where they have no way to prove that they were selected. This                  
means that they cannot even try to sell their vote, and can’t prove who they voted for, rendering                  
coercion impractical. Finally, both the selection and the voting are auditable by anyone who              
wants to, and all auditors can be sure that the selection was fair and that the vote was not                   
tampered with (as any hacking would immediately be detected).  
 
 
Now that we have a sample that is anonymous and incorruptible, we need to give it information,                 
and a way to exchange and learn. This leads to the second technological breakthrough. 
 
Intelligent deliberation systems. ​One pervasive problem in online (and real-life) debates is the             
repetition of the same argument, and the difficulty in organizing the different lines of thought.               
Recent advances in artificial intelligence and user interfaces hold great promise in that regard,              
with services such as Kialo, pol.is, or vTaiwan. This kind of technology has many advantages:  
- It allows people to intelligently contribute to online political debates, generally with little             
cost to the user. 
- It presents not just the arguments but also the clusters of people in favor of each                
argument, and the opinions of a population.  
- It is very scalable, with discussions engaging at least tens of thousands of people at the                
same time (for now).  
- It is flexible, being most frequently open source, translatable and adaptable with minimal             
costs to many different uses. 
 
With these tools, we can now create a parliament with the right incentives and the desired                
properties.  
 
Upper House 
The upper house is the most visible part of the model, where each member state has official                 
representation and a single vote. Its role is to represent the diversity of countries and cultures                
and to ensure states’ participation within the model.  
 
Missions  
The main purpose of the upper house is to draft and recommend resolutions. Its main duties are                 
the following: 
- Drafting proposals that are then submitted to the lower house. 
- Writing reports advising the lower house on the effects and consequences of proposals.  
- Engaging the public during the deliberation period and answering questions. 
- Ordering investigations in case of suspected wrongdoings from the executive council (at            
the initiative of a quorum of 10 member states). 
- Voting to confirm decisions that have obtained majority by a small margin in the lower               
house, or to decide among multiple proposals that have all received strong popular             
support.  
 
Membership 
Every member state sends a permanent delegation to represent it in the upper house. This               
delegation, headed by an ambassador, represents the interests of the state in the absence of a                
member of government and advises it on technical issues.  
Although the delegations could interact exclusively through the internet, it seems more efficient             
to have them meet in a physical setting, which would be granted extraterritoriality. The              
delegation benefits from the privileges guaranteed by the Vienna Convention of 1961. 
 
 
Reports 
In addition to writing drafts of proposals to be sent to the lower house, the other main role of the                    
upper house members is making reports to inform the members of the public. To avoid               
overwhelming the public and the lower house, there should be a limited number of concise               
reports, all well-sourced. Thus, any member state will be able to make a single report on each of                  
the proposals submitted to the lower house. Naturally, multiple members would be strongly             
encouraged to combine their work (also increasing its visibility). This means that for every issue               
there should be at most a few different reports to read for each position. 
 
Trustworthiness 
With these official reports being the main part of the information given to the lower house, an                 
important problem becomes the vetting of the statements in them, to establish which are              
correct, which are biased, and which are outright propaganda. In the age of fake news, it is                 
necessary to have a neutral arbiter commenting on all reports. This role would be filled by the                 
executive council. 
Although state-sponsored propaganda is very frequent today, it is generally distributed through            
viral means, and its contents are seldom officially endorsed. If a member state were to write a                 
visibly biased report, it would reflect negatively on the state.  
 
Delays 
Parliaments are considered inefficient in many countries, as they often struggle to pass             
important legislation in time. This is due to the complexity inherent in creating and adapting               
laws, and doing it in a worldwide setting would not make it better. Some features, however,                
prevent the upper house from being too slow. The first is that by design it only concerns itself                  
with a limited set of issues (the worst risks menacing humanity), and each member is not just a                  
representative but also has a cabinet of experts hired by the country (as opposed to usual                
parliamentarians who rarely have those means). The second is that each state has a strong               
incentive to submit a concrete proposal to the lower house in six months (or to support another                 
member’s proposal), as they can’t prevent a vote from happening. They have another three              
months (at most) to respond to other states’ proposals.  
 
Lower House 
The lower house is the main focus of the model, and is actually not a single entity, but a                   
collection of entities, one per group of decisions that need to be made. Each time a vote is                  
required, a group of one million people is taken at random from the general adult population of                 
Earth. This forms a temporary instance of the lower house, dedicated to a given subject. The                
members are informed of their role and their duty, and have one year to make a decision. The                  
idea is that, instead of making the experts vote (as in a technocracy), we should make sure that                  
the voters themselves become experts. First, though, why select one million members for the              
lower house?  
 
Membership 
 
Although one million members would have been impossible to handle in a physical setting, it               
becomes relatively easy with online deliberation and voting tools (which have already been used              
for large public debates in countries with tens of millions of citizens). As we have seen earlier,                 
such a group would be representative of all of mankind. Moreover, even if multiple lower houses                
were needed at the same time (on different subjects), only a very small fraction of people would                 
be asked to participate in multiple houses at the same time. It is, however, still big enough that                  
once the model is used, most people will know someone who will have participated, to               
guarantee public engagement.  
The members are selected through the use of a central database. Every member state defines               
the rules regarding which citizens are included, as long as they are older than a commonly                
agreed threshold. They are free to exclude certain categories of people (such as convicts) but it                
is not in their interest as it diminishes their voting power. 
 
Decision-making ability 
Once the one million members of a lower house are chosen, they are contacted (for example,                
by letter or email) informing them of their role in the upcoming debate and vote. Over the next                  
year, they are encouraged to follow the deliberations of the upper house and to give their own                 
opinions, just like everybody else in the world. Finally, they are to read the main reports and                 
make their decision.  
From the parliament’s design, we can derive multiple properties concerning the set of             
decision-makers in the lower house: 
- They are well-informed, thanks to the reports from the upper house, which should be as               
unbiased as possible through the rating and commenting system.  
- Through the online deliberation platform, they also know what the people most invested             
in the issue (activists, for example) think about it. 
- They have time to look at the issue at their own speed, and can have any questions                 
answered. 
- They are highly motivated, as they feel that their decision has a real effect (experiments               
have shown that abstention goes down quickly when voters feel that they have an              
impact). 
- They are representative of mankind as a whole. 
 
Together, these results show that the lower house’s decision corresponds to the decision that              
humanity would agree on if given the time and resources needed to come to an informed                
decision. It doesn’t mean that this decision would necessarily be the correct one, but if we are to                  
hope that democracy can work, it is the best achievable.  
 
Primacy over the upper house 
Any proposal submitted to the lower house and agreed upon by a simple majority has to go                 
back to the upper house to be validated (once again, by simple majority). However, if a proposal                 
obtains more than two thirds of the popular vote, the upper house cannot vote it down.  
In the case where multiple proposals get strong popular support, either a new vote can be held                 
in the lower house to choose the best one (with little additional delay), or a vote can be held in                    
 
the upper house, with the proposal garnering the highest average support across both houses              
being selected. 
 
Executive Council 
Role 
The executive council has two main duties: 
- Addressing unforeseen emergencies that require immediate worldwide cooperation        
(such as epidemics and natural disasters). 
- Implementing the decisions taken by the houses and checking that all countries comply             
with them. 
 
Size and replacement 
There is a maximum possible size for any committee to be able to meet quickly and work                 
efficiently, which means that the executive council has to be small. Here we consider a council                
of 5 members, as it seems optimal, although 7 could be possible. There is no member with more                  
weight than others, but for honorific duties the longest-serving member has priority. The             
members all serve a term of 75 months, and are replaced progressively (one by one, every 15                 
months). The progressive replacement and long mandates guarantee stability and a focus on             
long-term solutions to the crises that come up.  
 
Regional groups 
To guarantee a rotation of the executive council that balances the interest of all countries, the                
world is divided into 5 abstract regions, with a councilor for each. The regions correspond to                
countries that share opinions and goals rather than geographic proximity. This means that             
groups of countries with similar goals can unite to guarantee representation in the council. 
Unlike the United Nations’ regional groups, those regions are fluid, and any member state can               
decide to change their group allegiance once per year. This prevents situations in which one               
region has twice as many members as another, except if it suits the interests of all concerned                 
countries, and offers long-term flexibility in case of shifting power balances. 
 
Councilor selection 
Every councilor’s seat is temporarily held by a member state, and the person representing it               
officially can change within the term. Once a councilor’s term ends, elections are held within the                
corresponding regional group. Any state who hasn’t had a councilor in at least 75 months can                
run. The state that represents the region is elected by majority judgment without anonymity.              
That is, every state gives a rating to all the others, and the one with highest median grade wins,                   
and the lack of anonymity forces the judgment to be consistent, (removing the main weakness               
of majority judgment). To prevent abuse of the fluid region system, a member state that               
changes groups forfeits its right to vote in the next election for council member.  
The choice of the actual representative sent to the council by the elected state follows a few                 
main rules: 
- The councilor can be elected by the state’s citizens directly, or chosen by the              
government, depending on each state’s own rules. 
 
- The councilor should have no official role within that state (as an elected official or               
member of government), to guarantee their availability and focus on the council’s task. 
- A councilor may resign if they want to, but the state’s government cannot fire them               
directly. However, if they suspect wrong-doings, the state’s government can petition the            
upper house to impeach the councilor. 
- If the seat becomes vacant for any reason, the state selects another councilor in the               
same way as if it had just been elected.  
 
Powers 
The council has both normal and emergency powers that are to be regulated by decisions from                
the houses and evolve as needed. The initial normal powers are as follows: 
- Submitting a proposal to the parliament. 
- Ordering an investigation in case of suspected wrongdoing of a member state or official.  
- Proposing measures against a state if it fails to comply with decisions taken by the               
parliament. Those measures have to be approved by a simple majority in the upper              
house. 
- Proposing reforms to the model. 
- Issuing statements on the accuracy and bias present in upper house reports.  
 
The initial emergency powers (which can go against national sovereignty) could be the             
following, depending on the situation: 
- Breaking embargos and supervise aid sent to countries hit by natural disasters. 
- Temporarily restricting member countries’ border control rules to handle a sudden flow of             
refugees, and distribute them equitably among member states. 
- Imposing sanitary measures and travel limitations to prevent the spread of extremely            
infectious diseases. 
- Calling for an immediate vote in the upper house to extend the model’s jurisdiction              
(which requires a majority of four fifths), to increase the flexibility of the model in case of                 
emergencies. This power can and should be limited (for example, if any military capacity              
is given to the model, an extension of its jurisdiction should go through the usual               
channels).  
 
Votes in the executive council are by a simple majority, although extreme measures require              
either 4 votes, or unanimity depending on their nature.  
 
Responsibility 
Any actions taken by the councilor that are due to corruption or not in good faith engage not                  
only their own responsibility, but their state’s. If the review that happens after that councilor’s               
term finds that they acted in bad faith or tried to advantage some countries, the state they                 
represent can find itself forced to compensate the others, and lose the ability to run for councilor                 
for a time longer than 75 months.  
 
Court of Justice 
 
A court is attached to the model, with three main duties: 
- Investigating and prosecuting members accused through the previously discussed         
means.  
- Conducting the review of all councilors when they leave office.  
- Settling disputes between member states over interpretation of decisions taken. 
Its members are elected at a two thirds majority (in the upper house) among respected legal                
professionals, and serve for life. Three different chambers handle the court’s duties to avoid              
conflicts of interest. 
Cases are judged according to the regulations created by the model when applicable, and to the                
defendant’s national legal system otherwise.  
 
Agenda Setting  
Even if the decision is ultimately in the hands of the people, it is possible to prevent their will                   
from being acted upon by refusing to address certain subjects within the parliament’s jurisdiction              
despite strong popular backing. To solve this problem, there are multiple ways to make sure that                
a subject is treated by parliament: 
- Members of the upper house can initiate a debate on a given subject if they have the                 
needed quorum of 25% of the house. 
- The executive council can also be the initiator.  
- Finally, any organization or association can petition the executive council. To show that             
not only the petitioners consider the subject important, a random sample of the             
population is taken (smaller than for the lower house, with only 10000 members). The              
subject is studied in parliament if more than 25% of the sample believe it should.  
 
Detailed Timeline 
 
In a normal non-emergency setting, the decision-making process takes slightly more than a year              
from the initial thought to the decision being taken.  
The first step is to consider a new subject that requires international cooperation for treatment               
within the model. This can be done by the upper house, the executive council or any                
organization willing to pay for the petitioning and sampling costs. If the subject is not within the                 
model’s jurisdiction, the council can order an immediate vote in the upper house to extend the                
jurisdiction (needing unanimity). 
The second step is to draw one million people at random to form a lower house. Those people                  
are informed of their rights and duties then encouraged to follow the debates. 
Thirdly, each member of the upper house has six months to propose a potential solution for the                 
problem at hand or join another member’s proposal (they can remain silent, but it is not in their                  
interest). Public comments and critiques on the proposals have to be answered within a certain               
time. 
Within the next three months, countries have to rate other proposals and write a report on each                 
(generally as a group of countries). 
During that time, public deliberation on AI-assisted platforms gives the public an idea of what               
people invested in the issue believe.  
 
One year after the drawing, the lower house votes on each of the proposals, after being                
informed by the public deliberation and reports. 
Depending on the margin, the proposal can be directly implemented or confirmed by the upper               
house. If multiple proposals are successful, a decision (in either the upper or lower house) is                
made within one month to select the best one. If no proposal garners a simple majority but                 
some have more than 40% support, the most popular one is presented to the upper house                
where it requires 60% approval to pass. In case no proposal gets sufficient support, the subject                
can be put to the upper house after a delay of five years.  
All member states have a set amount of time to comply with the decision, which the executive                 
council enforces, through economic penalties if needed. 
 
Power and Resources 
The model as presented here does not include military capabilities, although it could be an               
extension (in which case interventions would have to be approved by unanimity in the executive               
council). This limits the council’s power to enforce the decisions taken by the parliament, leaving               
only economical means. However, those means could be extremely strong thanks to the design              
of the system.  
For instance, if a member state were to repeatedly refuse to comply with the decisions, an                
embargo could eventually be proposed by the council. To prevent rash decisions, a measure of               
this magnitude would have to be confirmed by a majority in the upper house and a strong                 
majority in the lower house (in both cases, the target state and its citizens would not have voting                  
power). Although individual states might have little desire to implement the embargo due to the               
economic consequences on their own economies, the widespread popular support for the            
measure would force them to also comply. Moreover, if needed, it would be possible to               
compensate those that are most affected. Insofar as most states agree on the terms, this would                
give extremely strong incentives to collaborate and follow the system’s decisions without directly             
infringing on national sovereignty.  
 
Implementation and Transition 
So far, most advances in international cooperation have followed catastrophes of unseen-before            
magnitude. To prevent the next catastrophe, there must be strong incentives for states to join a                
new institution, even though it could restrict their powers or national sovereignty on certain              
subjects. 
The problem with any system that aims to change the status quo, however, is that current                
beneficiaries of said status quo are generally against any change. As this model seeks to               
replace part of the United Nations’ decision-making protocol, the countries currently benefiting            
from it may be against its implementation. Those countries would most probably be the ones               
with permanent seats on the security council, and their allies who benefit from such a privileged                
position. This is true for the model shown here, but also for any model with similar goals.  
In some cases, international pressure can make a member state change its policy, but if the five                 
permanent members decided to block a new global institution, they could probably withstand the              
economic consequences (making any economic threats useless). 
 
This means that, instead of relying on external pressure, any new model should at least partially                
rely on internal pressure to adhere to a new institution of global cooperation. This is where this                 
model has an advantage, because a major threat to international cooperation, in the public’s              
eye, lies in the fear that bureaucrats and oligarchs will lower regulations and profit at the                
expense of the people (through trade agreements and immigration). Thus, a model that relies              
directly on the people and where they have the last word would have great appeal to the people                  
of the different crucial countries.  
A possible strategy for implementation would be to have a compact calling for the              
implementation of the model once enough signatories join (like the National Popular Vote             
Interstate Compact in the USA​). ​Starting with countries that have much to gain (such as India, or                 
Indonesia), most other countries that are currently not advantaged by institutions could join             
(mostly members of the G77). Then, international pressure to adhere and internal popular             
pressure to give more power to the people instead of politicians could make some key countries                
sign (depending on electoral luck), increasing the pressure on the remaining uninvolved            
countries each time, until all major countries abide by the model.  
 
 
 
Potential Issues 
Despite its advantages, there are multiple potential weaknesses in the model proposed. Here             
are the main issues, and how they could be addressed. 
 
Central census 
To have the ability to correctly draw at random people from all around the Earth, one needs to                  
have a central database with all eligible people. Today, no such database exists (in public               
knowledge, at least). However, more and more countries have individual centralized databases,            
and the number is growing due to increased availability of the technology. The challenges in               
creating and maintaining one unique merger of all of those would be threefold: 
- Preventing access to the database from unauthorized parties (that is, prevent hacking). 
- Guaranteeing that every eligible person is in the database. 
- Guaranteeing that every entry corresponds to a real person. 
As the number of people with access would be limited, securing the database should not be too                 
hard. However, the main problem lies in the fact that countries would have an interest in inflating                 
their census data. Thankfully, independent investigation could easily estimate how prevalent this            
is, and in case of real fraud the state at fault could be penalized. To this end, the census should                    
not just reveal basic information on the person, but also a way to contact them (which will be                  
increasingly easy in a connected world).  
It would also be possible for the system to be opt-in, in which case it would be in the countries’                    
best interest to provide as much information as possible to motivate people to participate.  
The member states are encouraged to provide technological expertise to countries with            
inadequate infrastructure, to provide equivalent participation opportunities to all citizens their           
countries.  
 
 
Equitable access 
In this document, we have assumed that almost everyone on our planet has access to               
information, generally through the internet. This is not yet true, as only slightly more than half of                 
the world has internet access today. However, it is reasonable to think that by the time our                 
model could be implemented globally, only a small percentage of the population wouldn’t have              
access to it. Moreover, all the different components could work offline, or at least be spread                
offline to populations without internet (this is true for the debates and the reports, but more                
importantly the vote). Illiteracy could also be an issue, but it is decreasing quickly enough that it                 
should be a minor problem by the time the model is implemented (moreover, text-to-speech              
technology would also be a potential solution). 
A second problem would be the language barrier, but this could be handled in multiple ways.                
First, automatic translation is already a viable possibility (although dangerous, as legal speech             
is very nuanced). Second, each state could be responsible for the translation of its different               
reports and proposals into the official languages of all member states (possibly with the help of                
a dedicated translation office attached to the upper house).  
The last problem to handle to guarantee equitable access is the financial one, with wealthier               
populations being able to devote more time to studying the issue, and thus being              
over-represented (as the others might abstain or vote randomly). One potential solution to this              
would be a small financial transfer through cryptocurrencies (to preserve anonymity) as the             
voters are selected. This would allow the poorest voters to spend time on the issue without                
struggling to make ends meet. Its effect on the other voters would, however, be complex to                
study, as financial reward could increase abstention in certain cases.  
 
Proposal wording 
Even with popular control of both agenda-setting and voting on legislation, it is still possible to                
orient the decisions of both houses by creating proposals with biased language or sentences              
meant to unduly influence the voters’ decision. Member states can preemptively solicit the             
opinion of the executive council in order to ensure neutral wording and to avoid a negative                
comment from the council. 
When it comes to the wording of petitions, it is the petitioning organization’s goal to stimulate                
interest, so there is no risk of adverse bias (the only risk being that people could be less                  
interested in the subject than initially thought).  
 
Propaganda 
Two types of propaganda are possible. One would be the diffusion through the system of               
strongly biased reports, or the discrediting of some reports by groups of countries. In both               
cases, the ability of the model to counter this depends on the existence of an honest fraction of                  
the upper house. If such a thing cannot be achieved, however, any hope at international               
cooperation would be void.  
The second and much more worrisome type lies in the indoctrination of a population to the point                 
that they always vote according to the recommendations of their government, even if the              
corresponding report has been denounced as biased by all other members. This is a real               
 
concern, but it is unavoidable in any worldwide democratic system. Indeed, any governance             
model has three options: 
- Countries have a single vote each, 
- Countries have a vote with weight proportional to their population, 
- Populations vote directly (or through sampling). 
The first one discriminates against big countries and isn’t truly democratic, and the risk of               
indoctrination in the third is still an improvement over the united front presented by a country in                 
the second option.  
Some measures could also alleviate the problem partially. For example, strong encryption when             
accessing the reports could at least give access to all documents to the indoctrinated population               
(although if there is a camera pointed at every screen, that wouldn’t help). More importantly,               
external pressure (and economic threats) could potentially push a country to stop (or reduce) its               
indoctrination. 
 
 
  
 
Core Values 
The power in this model lies in the lower houses (one per given subject). On any given matter,                  
the decision is made by a group that is mathematically representative of mankind, even more so                
than in normal referenda as the increased responsibility and ease of access would lead to               
diminished abstention. This would counteract the effect of overrepresentation of the upper            
classes in most votes.  
As we are all fallible and influenceable, we must also be wary of our worst tendencies. However,                 
it is much easier to influence people who do not study a subject for long, and who vote with their                    
guts, as they know that their vote doesn't really matter due to large number of voters and thus                  
diminished individual responsibility. In this model, the increased responsibility of each           
participant leads to more time spent on the issue, and lower vulnerability to disinformation              
campaigns.  
When it comes to minority protection, the very nature of the decisions to be made by the lower                  
houses and their limited field of application should prevent most types of targeting, but the upper                
house is also responsible when it comes to making sure that no prejudiced decision makes it to                 
the lower houses. Moreover, a relatively frequent problem in some democracies comes from a              
vocal and motivated minority oppressing a smaller minority, while the majority stays neutral (due              
to lack of information and motivation). This effect would be reduced in any model with               
decreased abstention from the neutral majority, like the one presented here. 
Thus, the people making the decision would be representative of humanity, and their values              
representative of mankind’s, while their biases would be partially prevented by an increased             
sense of responsibility and a lower sensitivity to propaganda. 
 
One has to be careful here, because many schools of thought (from all origins) have a tendency                 
to claim universality too quickly. It is easy to observe a supremacist attitude in many countries                
by asking two questions (the following example would target a Frenchman but would be              
applicable to most people in democracies): 
- Should a global governance system give every person on Earth the same weight? 
- Would you be ready to submit to a system where China has twenty times more votes                
than France? 
The answer to the first would overwhelmingly be yes as it is among the core principles of                 
democracy, but the second would receive wide opposition, even if people were assured that              
minorities would be protected. Any system that gives equal weight to all humans must then               
confront some measure of imperialist and independentist thought from even staunch defenders            
of democracy.  
Thus the values defended could be far from the values currently accepted in many western               
countries.  
 
Decision-Making Capacity 
 
To ensure high reactivity, two different decision-making systems are included in the model. In              
case of real-time emergencies, such as major natural disasters or extreme epidemics, the             
executive council can meet at a moment’s notice, thanks to its reduced size and the fact that its                  
 
members have no stronger commitments. They have a strong mandate to coordinate worldwide             
efforts while following the guidelines previously established by the parliament. Moreover, they            
have strong incentives to act quickly, as they are examined after their mandates not just on their                 
actions, but also their potential inaction (thus preventing Paull’s postcautionary principle). 
 
The second decision-making system lies with the houses of parliament, which both work with              
enforceable deadlines. When tasked with proposing solutions, the members of the upper            
houses have a strong interest to either come up with one or support someone else’s solution by                 
the time the six months are over. As for the lower houses, once the upper house publishes its                  
different proposals, they all have six more months to select their favorite, ensuring that a               
decision is made in at most one year. Those delays can be made shorter or longer in very                  
specific cases, upon the executive council’s authority (the delay should be set when the initial               
task is given to the upper house).  
 
As opposed to the current security council of the United Nations, no member state has a                
permanent seat on the executive council, preventing unilateral blocking of potentially important            
decisions (as is still frequently practiced). This means that any single member state can only               
delay the implementation of a decision by at most 5 years. Moreover, the lower house can                
decide to dismiss (and potentially impeach) a member of the council, leading to immediate              
elections, if that member is preventing decisive actions from being taken.  
 
Finally, the agenda itself can evolve quickly to address rising concerns, as the house has to                
address any petition with widespread support (25% of a random sample of 10000).  
 
Effectiveness 
The model has multiple advantages when it comes to effectiveness. First, it gives very strong               
incentives not just to act, but also to act while keeping in mind the long-term objectives, partially                 
through the long mandates enjoyed by the executive council’s members. The lower house is              
minimally biased and represents the stakeholders directly (i.e. the people), with next to no input               
from interest groups. However, those groups can spend their wealth on producing compelling             
high-quality data and arguments to defend their position. As they are not able to bombard the                
lower house with those but only to offer them on a balanced public deliberation platform, we can                 
assume that the lower house will have access to balanced high-quality material to take              
reasonable decisions with the long term good of humanity in mind. 
Once those decisions are made, the main duty of the council is to implement them. Here a                 
reasonable approach is taken, with each concerned state having to take the necessary             
measures under penalty of harsh economic sanctions. Before those sanctions are applied,            
however, they would need to be validated by a strong majority of the lower house. This gives                 
much more weight to the decision, as it would be much more costly for a government to publicly                  
go against such decisions when they face overwhelming worldwide condemnation and serious            
financial sanctions. 
 
Resources and Financing 
 
This model presents a deliberation and decision-making body, which mostly relies on individual             
states to implement the measures taken. This allows it to have minimal operating costs,              
depending on the financing structure used. The amount of centralized bureaucracy needed for             
the main components to work is very limited, as most of the different tasks can be accomplished                 
by each state independently. Indeed, it would fall upon the different states to produce reports               
and gather data and resources to inform the lower house (those reports would be subject to                
general approval to limit biased reports). As for the lower house itself, it mostly requires an                
online platform and the cost of getting the citizens their ballots securely. A focus on online work                 
with open data in a common framework would also limit the expenses. 
The need for bureaucracy and central services would mostly consist of the following: 
- A permanent inspection unit, tasked with checking the accuracy of census data. 
- A centralized translation service for the upper house. 
- A service in charge of providing expertise and assisting the councilors. 
There would also be the costs associated with the physical upper house and court, but all                
considered, the costs would be a fraction of current U.N. operating budget, which would be paid                
by all member states proportionally to their GDP.  
 
Trust and Insight 
The best way to get people to trust a system is to make it entirely transparent and invite them to                    
participate. Those are two essential parts of the model, as the lower house is not only                
composed of the people it represents, but is also informed by them through the public               
deliberation system.  
Every single step should be accessible to the people, from upper house and council              
deliberations to reports published by the different expert boards to the critiques of those reports.               
Most importantly, the vote in the upper house would not be secret but public knowledge, while                
the vote in the lower house would be verifiable, preventing manipulation and making collusion              
very visible. As a final step, the automatic review of all officials should instill confidence in the                 
system’s ability to fight corruption. 
Through the use of simple and transparent tools, great public confidence can thus be achieved. 
 
Flexibility 
Any model should account for the possibility of change, without making it too easy. The biggest                
threat to change, as we have seen, lies in the existence of a privileged few who will defend their                   
own interests. The model proposed gets rid of some of the privileges present in the U.N. and                 
many organizations, so it would face strong initial opposition as already discussed. However,             
making our model evolve would be easier, because it would start from a position of higher                
equality. Moreover, the three quarters majority needed in the lower house to implement any real               
modification would be realistically attainable if the people feel the need for the model to evolve.                
As the only reason to make the model evolve is to address emergencies that had not been                 
foreseen and that couldn't be handled by it in its current state, it is safe to assume that it would                    
only evolve when it needs to. And in case of new perils, when it would need to change, most                   
people would probably agree with that need, leading to organic change as needed. The greater               
the urgency, the greater the popular will, and the easier it would be to effect those changes.                 
 
Finally, unlike the present U.N. regional groups, the groups represented in the executive council              
are fluid and can evolve naturally over time.  
 
Protection against the Abuse of Power 
 
There are four different barriers to prevent abuse of power by the model. The first one is that the                   
power ultimately lies in the hands of the people, and that strong decisions require strong               
majorities. These people are shielded from corruption and coercion, and anonymous, meaning            
that they can be as impartial as feasible.  
 
The second barrier is the upper house, which can guide the lower house by issuing reports and                 
prevent certain proposals if they threaten any minorities that require protection. 
 
The third barrier corresponds to the guarantees offered by the fact that the model has a limited                 
jurisdiction, and its threats to national sovereignty are very limited in scope and agreed upon by                
all members (they would mostly concern nuclear and biohazard risks). Economic sanctions that             
are widely implemented would not infringe on national sovereignty but still provide a strong              
enough incentive to comply with the system.  
 
The last barrier comes through the automatic review of each member of the council after their                
service, and the close scrutiny that prevents them from visibly making biased decisions.             
Moreover, the possibility to dismiss or impeach a councilor by the houses prevents too much               
damage being done by someone not afraid of consequences. This also applies to countries, as               
conviction of a member of the house or council has repercussions not just on their person but                 
on their home country (in the form of temporary ineligibility in the council or fines, for example). 
 
Accountability 
 
By design, only part of the system can be held accountable. The lower houses, populated by                
members of the general population, are anonymous, and couldn’t be held accountable in any              
way. However, as they have absolutely nothing to personally gain from their vote (as the system                
prevents vote-selling and lobbying), it is reasonable to assume that they vote and act in good                
faith. Current studies on voter behavior show that people act more seriously when given actual               
power and responsibilities, so the risk of a significant proportion of the lower house being               
obstructive is negligible. 
 
On the other hand, for both the upper house and the executive council, all the actions and                 
discussions are a matter of public knowledge, with open data as a foundation. Not only are                
those actions visible while the members are in office, but an automatic thorough review of each                
member of the executive council removes most incentives to commit wrongdoings. The court’s             
ability to prosecute is a final guarantee that the people can hold the decision-makers              
accountable. 
 
 
